

# STATE, BORDER, AŞİRET: Re-Construction of Aşiret as an Ethnic Identity

## ABSTRACT:

In this essay, I am going to talk about two *koçer* (nomadic) Kurdish *aşiret*'s gaining of their ethnic identities and defending themselves via the relations with the PKK and the state. Through their adventures of settlement and becoming an *aşiret* since the beginning of the Republic—perhaps before that—I will point out why and how their Kurdisness and ethnic gloves can be substituted for one another. Thirdly, I want to state that, apart from being nostalgia and taking its base from this very nature, how *aşiret* can be accepted as an ethnic arena and whether it can provide the possible grounds for a national identity. Hence, lastly, I can utter the disadvantages of including merely ethnicity under the frame of identity, or in contrast, the perception of ethnicity merely as an identity problem.

## PREFACE

For the last two decades, academics, politicians, readers of politics who write and think and write about Southeast and/or East Anatolia, Middle East and Kurds, and those who create policies over the theories from inside and outside the university, those who do not think whilst producing policies, those to rule and yet are ruled feel the need to say something about *aşiret*. These words commence with the urge for making a definition

and carry on with the decision that *aŞiret* can never be defined properly. Nevertheless, these groups that are understood to have the need for deep establishments on the Kurdish problem tend to make some generalisations on the quality of *aŞiret* and thus conceptualise the definition. Unfortunately, *aŞiret* functions as a stylish object of discussion and a sort of “brand” after all.

In this essay, I am going to talk about two *koçer* (nomadic) Kurdish *aŞiret*'s gaining of their ethnic identities and defending themselves via the relations with the the PKK and the state. Through their adventures of settlement and becoming an *aŞiret* since the beginning of the Republic—perhaps before that—I will point out why and how their Kurd and ethnic gloves can be substituted for one another. Thirdly, I want to state that, apart from being nostalgia and taking its base from this very nature, how *aŞiret* can be accepted as an ethnic arena and whether it can provide the possible grounds for a national identity. Hence, I can utter the disadvantages of including merely ethnicity under the frame of identity, or in contrast, the perception of ethnicity merely as an identity problem.

In this study, bringing the case studies in the foreground<sup>2</sup> I will discuss the theory as a narrative. Thus, it will be possible to voice the meaning of belonging to an *aŞiret* emically, as it is not possible for a social structure not to respond to the demands that affect itself via an interior evidence.

As it is expected, all the names in this work have been changed<sup>3</sup>. The work is about two *koçer* (nomadic) *aŞirets*<sup>4</sup> in an unknown town on Turkey-Iraq border; let us call the town *Bizim* (Ours) and the *aŞirets*, *Deşti* (from the savannah), and *Ciyai* (from the mountain). I am going to explicate the settlement of these two *koçer* structures from the point of view that property owners have changed. However, going too far, I would like to

---

<sup>2</sup> This study is based on the research entitled “The Sociology of Border Towns”, conducted in the borders of Iran, Iraq and Syria between 2001 and 2003, which was supported by TUBITAK. In this research, Özlem Biner, Alp Buğdaycı and Şebnem Eraş assisted the field study and helped furthering the discussions. I would like to thank them for their invaluable contributions. Special thanks should be given to all those who have formed the construction of this work through telling their own stories and whom I have conversed during the field study. Besides that, I also thank Hasan Şen for his revision and invaluable criticism.

<sup>3</sup> If gone too far in the discovery of the names, their existence will immediately be denied.

<sup>4</sup> Bloch emphasizes that the best thing to explain the cement of the period before feudalism was not “cognition”. According to him, the most crucial indicator of the *kebile* (community) during the period before feudalism was the religious communities that share “remaining silent for a partnership” as a common bond. See Bloch, M., 1995: 117.

render the various forms and periods of seizing not only the property, but also the surplus as an agent in this discussion.

I will discuss all these issues, but for now, my reader, I expect you to read the adventures of *Bizim* during the period of becoming a county. Yet, the story of this small county begins with the story of its possession<sup>5</sup>.

## **I. TIME IN *BIZIM***

In *Bizim*, the documentation of history goes back to very old times. The town became a district beginning from the end of 1930s. It is an old Assyrian settlement; it is told that its church was built even before AC 70s. There is a significant place of *Bizim* in the prominent monastery of the area. The documents and narrations demonstrate that this town had been an important centre of culture (and absolutely emplacement) and defence after its last fifty years of dispute between Assyrian Christians and Moslim Kurds.

Many villages of *Bizim* are known to be old Assyrian settlements (Andrews, 1989). Especially, in the villages that are close to the border, horizontal migration of Assyrians which had begun in 1914, gained a considerable speed after 1945 and became mass emigration. It is known that the centre of the district consisted of 750 households in 1938 and until 1960, the population was completely Assyrian except for the civil servant families. However, in 1970, there remained 400 Assyrian households in the district. With the fast rush of the Moslim Kurds beginning from 1970 and placement of nomadic *aşirets* at the centre of *Bizim* after the 1977 elections, Moslim Kurd population has gained supremacy at the centre. Today, the Assyrian population at the centre has remained 31 people at 8 residences that belong to the church, 50-55 households at a village and 20-21 households at another village. Another village of 64 households that is a Yezidi settlement, has been evacuated in a few days due to a seemingly honour killing case, actually a lynch event, and a group of village guards has been placed in the village in 1987.

### **T.1. Population**

#### **1) Number    2) Increase rates to the previous year %**

---

<sup>5</sup> Translated into by Funda Civelekoğlu, special thanks to her.

	Rural		Urban		TOTAL
	1	2	1	2	
<b>1940</b>	11916		1674		13573
<b>1945</b>	10925	-0.91	1344	0.84	12269
<b>1950</b>	11953	10.93	1081	-0.85	13034
<b>1960</b>	19265	14.22	1694	14.54	20959
<b>1970</b>	25718	11.17	2624	12.44	28324
<b>1980</b>	30072	11.02	6202	12.76	36274
<b>1990</b>	31159	-0.94	12905	15.23	44064
<b>1997</b>	33198	10.65	12591	-0.97	46149
<b>2000</b>	40870	27.12	19123	39.32	59993

As it is seen in the above chart, it is necessary to separate the population profile of *Bizim* as villages and county borough; for the population of the centre does not increase in equal ratio with the migration from the rural areas to the county borough. We can clarify the reasons of the decrease of population in the villages between 1940 and 1945 with the rapid emigration of the Assyrians and that the Moslim Kurdish population was not yet settled. Between 1955 and 1960, the decrease results from the first worker emigration and horizontal emigrations—after tractors began to be used in the villages; migration from the countryside in the whole country has started. Between 1970 and 1975, the reasons of the decrease in population appear to be the horizontal emigrations due to education and better economic conditions (the situation was effective in whole Turkey) and rapid emigration of the Assyrians once again. After 1980, it is the immense violence period<sup>6</sup> that causes vertical and horizontal emigration, which decreases the population in the villages. A rather diverse profile might be drawn for the county borough: in the centre, the decrease in the villages in 1940-1945 turned out to happen in 1945-1950, since the Christian population had left the county much later, migration had influenced the centre in this period and internal migration had been experienced in the centre before the villages. For the Assyrians, the reason of this migration is the practices of *Varlık Vergisi*(Wealth Tax). The gradual decrease in 1960-65 might be explained through the internal migration conditions. The county borough had drained population between the years 1970 and 1975; this appears to result from the decrease of population in the

<sup>6</sup> I prefer to name the period of struggles between the Turkish State and the PKK between 1989 and 1996 in Turkey instead of emphasising any ideology such as “war”, “fight” or “low intense war” or “war of terrorists” etc.

villages. A point that attracts attention is that in this period the county borough was deserted rapidly by the Assyrians and thus Moslim-Kurd settlements cannot be identified with numbers. Assyrians that were negotiated have determined the reason of this rapid external flow as “the hostility towards Christians that had grown violent with the landing of Turkish troops in Cyprus”. For the county borough migrations in 1980 and the period after, the only thing that can be said is that “the county has become a ‘two-gate’ crossing point”; below chart displays various comparisons of the population of *Bizim* villages and the county borough.

**T.2. Average Annual Increase in centre of *Bizim* and Villages**

	1965-1985	%	1985-1990	%	1985-1997	%
<b><i>Bizim</i>-centre</b>	24		69		-0.9	
<b>Villages</b>	32		-0.64		-0.02	

As it is seen, *Bizim* has rapidly attracted population in 1985-1990, and after 1985 it started to lose population. This situation renders the centre of *Bizim* as “not having a settled populace”.

In the immense violence period, how many villages and sub- village settlements there was in *Bizim*, was a subject of dispute (rather a controversial issue). The numbers of various official channels were contradictory. That every public institution considered some fields and *kom* (sub-village) as village-like (e.g. places that are regarded as school by the Ministry of Education management and those that are regarded as police offices by the gendarmerie were counted as villages) according to their private purposes as much as replacements after evacuations have a role in that. Other factors might be illustrated as such: new counties were formed and some villages were given to these counties, taking some villages from the former counties, forgetting about these villages in the new mapping and classification, or the Kurdish and Turkish names of the villages did not match one another. Today, in any Southeast county, there are at least five villages that have ‘teke (billy goat)’, ‘ağaç (tree)’, ‘kuyu (well)’, ‘tepe (hill)’, ‘su (water)’, etc. in their names. In some of the maps of *Bizim*, there can be seen villages with the same name or the names were mistakenly referred to: e.g. Teke or Tekke, instead of Tepe.

Subsequently, we can explain the reasons for this chaos with administrative, personal, religious, political or economical issues and villages’ gradual movements as

follows: a) being emptied, b) evacuation, c) re-opening for residence, d) re-placement, e) being divided into sub-groups gradually, etc. when the period of immense violence finished and the atmosphere calmed down a little, according to the last calculations, *Bizim* had 67 villages and sub-villages residences and 16 villages were emptied, evacuated or deserted.

### T.3. Annual Average of Income for Various Groups

(2003 GNDP pp in Turkey: 3383\$)

Official deputy (inc. Village guards and/to any level of official)	1500-6500\$
Seasonal agricultural labour	500-2200\$
Temporary labour	500- 970 \$
Husbandry	1000- 4000\$
Driving, craftsmanship, small scale traders etc.	4000- 4300\$
Income of trade in medium ad large scale	2500- 32000\$
Owners of truck and truck fleet	10000- 44000\$

In *Bizim*, 50,5% of the county people have a monthly salary, 43,4% of them are living on agriculture and animal husbandry and only 6,7% of them practice trade or service.

## II. FOCUSES OF STRESS

Until the emigrations after 1980, every single agitation of population apparently stems from the transfer of the possession of property. Further on, I am going to utilise some case narratives for the analysis of these transfers. It seems that in all periods, these transfers and seizing resulted in the transmission of Yezidi Kurds' and Christians' lands to Moslim Kurds. Nonetheless, it would be a serious mistake to use merely religious or ethnic discrimination as a means to explain the acquisition of land possession. There again, the actual problem seems to be related with class, but it is compulsory to discuss the various forms of seizing the surplus.

In *Bizim*'s history, the most important code that shows whether being on the side of the state or not, is *Dagi olmak* (being from the mountain/belonging to the mountain)<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> Yalçın-Heckman also tells how Dahak myth has combined being from the mountain and staying against the state (2002); Izady emphasizes the importance of mountains according to Kurds. He claims "Mountain

Being from the mountain is explicated in three ways in three main periods: In the beginning, being a highlander is to have rebelled, in other words, to be a *Haverkan*. In the second period, *dagilik* is to be in a nomadic *aşiret*, being a nomad. In the third period, which means the last twenty years, being a *dagi* is sometimes being on the side of the PKK, sometimes being against the state, and sometimes going up to the mountain so as to revolt against the state. All these might be used for one another, as well. Among these metaphors, though all of them carry on their validity occasionally, the last one—as expected—has been manipulated and reproduced more than others.

Accordingly, the first conflict is whether to be a *Dekşuri*, or a *Haverki*. Bruinessen says that *Haverki aşiret* is a big confederation that is composed of 24 *aşirets*, some of which are Assyrian and Yezidi. In 1860s, this political- *aşiri* organisation (Bruinessen, 1992a: 126-131; Bruinessen, 2003:166) which appeared with Haco Agha and the discrimination of *Haverki* and *Dekşuri* has been perpetuated until 1950s. This conflict has been nurtured through being on the side of the Republic or not, then being united with England and/ or France, and later joining the Dersim Rebellion and thus becoming a legend through Hoybun Organisation though decreasingly, appears occasionally and is perpetuating its existence.

The second code of conflict “being nomad and settled” tells another axe of conflict: being a *Koçer* (nomad) or *Demanen* (resident) is considered as the most important point of conflict that determines almost all the aspects of a social structure. This opposition (adversity) is still put forward and valid occasionally. However, the period that being a resident and *koçer* caused a real conflict, was between 1950 and 1980. Within this period, since residence in the land was manipulated by the state, the actual conflict was referred to as ‘possessing the land property (property of land), or not’.

The stages of the third conflict was quite complex and it is told over a tradition that is mystified a great deal. What is more, understanding the new orders of property is exceedingly difficult around the metaphor of going to the mountain without deciphering the metonymies<sup>8</sup> defining it. The interesting thing is that most of the metaphors of “going to the mountain”, “at the mountain”, “being from the mountain”, etc. signify the same

---

for a Kurd is nothing less than the materialized form of god; the mountain is his/her mother, shelter, home, farm, market and only friend,”(2004: 328) and he not only explains how the mountain has become a metaphor, but also contributes to this issue.

meaning not only among the representatives, but also in the rhetoric of the state-centre. We can claim that *being a dagi* has not ever been metaphorised with a common acceptance as in this period. Perhaps, for the first time, the rhetoric of the state has become identical to that of its citizen, and the term is conceptualised in the same way, no matter it is contrary to the state. As a military term, *mountain* has been matched the terms of “Kurd” and “ethnic” with “rebel” in the discourse of the State, and Turkish Army and the rebel.

#### **A. THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NEW STATE: THE STRESS OF HAVERKAN AND DEKŞURAN:**

I will report the first indicator of the *aşiret* over *Dübendi*: being on the side of a bend, a *Haverkan* or a *Dekşuran* leaves a significant mark upon the relationship with the mainstream authority. For instance, *Ciyais* name their first period with the honour of being *Haverkan*. As it can be understood from the quotation (Halaçoğlu, 1997), *Ciyais* was a warrior *aşiret* and they were subject to regular exile between Diyarbekir and Rakka. At the beginning of the 1900s, Hadji H...t and Hadji M.....d (the two chiefs of the *aşiret*) were banished in Aydın for 23 years; however, they returned to the village of *Ciyai* in the county of Kulp, Diyarbakır. The chief of this *aşiret* that was forced to resettle has chosen the present village for residence, Siirt-Pervari way and Beyder village for the route of emigration and places in the region of Van-Çatak-Bahçesaray-Gevaş for final settlement. At the moment, there are 3000 *xane* (households) in Syria, 3000 in Siirt, 5000 in Diyarbakır, 70 in Erciş and 100 in Tatvan. Yet, this group is mainly bound to their own aghas, instead of Medet Agha. There is a population of 3500 people in their present village.

The first settlement in the village is in 1962. It is known that here was dwelling for the winter before that year. The only house that remained from that time, was the house of Hadji Mirza, the agha of the *aşiret*. Armenian country houses' influence can be observed in the architecture of this old house made of stone. In the house, there were two-sided independent rooms that look like a tunnel which is highly unfamiliar to Kurdish

---

<sup>8</sup> Metaphor tells the paradigmatic axis of a language, that is, the relationship between the terms that are substituted with one another; whereas metonymy states the syntagmatic axis of the language, which connotes the relation between the collateral terms. Metaphor is based on resemblance and connotes a vertical relation, whereas metonymy is based on proximity and connotes a horizontal relation, see Bilgin, N., 2003, Metaphor Entry.



village architecture. There are some traces in the Kurdish name of the village, that in the past there might have been an Armenian settlement here. At that time, the *aşiret* had quarrels with almost all other *aşirets* that were on its mountain paths. With their own narration, they say “Our men were cavalries. Houses were made and *mertlik* (manliness) was spoiled. We were going for 40 days. We were fighting with the villages on our way. We went with our guns, went for 10-15 kilometers per day. There was only a school for children at .... There was a high school at .....(city centre). We were going to the upland meadow on April 15. There were 20 stops. We stayed at the upland meadow for 5 months. We returned in October. In October 29, we were passing by .....We started sowing seeds as soon as we returned. We were renting this village after *Hazineyi Milliye*. Later, the state gave the village to us.” The thing that *Ciyais* are proud of most is passing animals from the border. “We used to pass the animals together. We were going together,” they say. This problem went on until 1964. when they laid mines on the border, *Ciyais* tell the relationship between being from the mountain and being from “home” as such: “The meadow belonged to Syria and the mountain remained for us.”

As another reason for conflict in this period, *Ciyais* mention the discrimination of *Haverkan* and *Dekşuran*. The event of Haco Agha<sup>9</sup> is recalled together with the metaphors of masculinity, because “The real men among Kurds take openly.” The father of Süleyman Çelebi, Saruhan Agha and Haco Agha’s fight was told and it is said: “It was from then on Çelebis were on the side of the state.” Hence, two confederations that assemble various sub-*aşirets*, called ‘*Dübendi*’ are told: *Haverkis* and *Dekşuris*. Being a *Haverki* was named as being against the state, and being a *Dekşuri* was named as being on the side of the state<sup>10</sup>. Yezidis and Assyrians could reside among *Havarkis*, yet I have not coincided any Yezidis or Assyrians among *Dekşuris*. There are two things I can say

---

<sup>9</sup> Haco Agha, before his death, had become one of the leading members of Hoybun and organised an important part of Ağrı Riot. See Alakom, 1998; Van Bruinessen, 1992a , pp:128-131.

<sup>10</sup> The main factor of the struggle was to reappear if it can nurture the *aşiret*. For instance, an *aşiret* fight that broke out in July, 1997 was seemingly a political party conflict, yet it was an act of placing an old balance of power on the agenda once more. The event might be considered as showing off the power. Similarly, the event that broke out in a wedding in ...., in August 1997—explosion of a hand grenade and deaths and injuries—is actually the reappearance of an old blood feud among the families of Şilit *bend*. Şilit aşera immediately gathered after the incident and *Deştis* took on the cost of the blood and punishment of exile. Hence, *Dübendi* had the opportunity to assure their basement through their blood bond by interfering again.

on *Dekşuris*: Firstly, most of the Arabians and all of the Mahelmis belong to *Dekşuris*<sup>11</sup>; and secondly, an remarkable event: in the previous years, with state permission, Assyrians who returned to their village that was deserted and had a village guard said “In the past, we were *Haverkis*, but now we are *Deşkuris*.” Thus, it might seem that to be one of the *bends* can be chosen voluntarily. Nevertheless, being a *Haverkan* or *Dekşuran* is not a decision to be made for the daytime by the chiefs of *aşirets*<sup>12</sup>.

### THE CHANGE OF POSSESSION IN LAND AND AFTER: THE STRESS *KOÇERS* AND *DÜMANİS*:

The conflict that best explicates the change of possession in land among Moslim Kurds in *Bizim* beginning from 1950 is the hatred-like intense feeling of exclusion between residents (*dümani-demanen*) and nomads (*koçers*).

The history of *koçers* was not documented long ago. Up to present, the groups that were examined by the social scientists working on *aşirets* were historically significant and immense pieces. The two *koçer aşirets* that I am going to analyse do not have a historical significance; contrarily, they are two tiny pieces of which historical

<sup>11</sup> *Mehelmis* (*Mhalmis*, *Mahhallemis*) were Assyrian according to some records, yet they had Arabian roots according to others. Having a family organization, mainly they lived in *Izyağ-ıl Mihellemiye* (Mehlemi villages) around Midyat like Acırlı (Derizbin), Gelinkaya (Kefer Huvar), Söğütlü (Kınderip), Şenköy (Epşın) and in the centre of Mardin, in Ömerli, Savur and Estel, which is a quarter of Midyat. Their language was an Arabic mixed with Syriac. The most remarkable opinion about them is that they are Assyrians that converted in 1209 because of Seljuks. See Hollerveger, 1999:17-55; Katip Çelebi, *Cihannüma*, 1732:438.

<sup>12</sup> Yalçın-Heckmann claim that supra-*aşirets* are the most convenient forms absolutely for bargains. While giving examples from Hakkari *aşirets*, they mention right and left wings and how they were decomposed as blocks in a confederation, opposed and support one another in the case of struggles and bargains. Yalçın-Heckman, 2002: 138. According to the findings appeared in Ziya Gökalp's work, *Dübendi*'s two branches were classified as such:

explored in this work	Ziya Gökalp's findings
Şilits Çıhsors	Şilits Çıhsors
Kıçans Düdeyran	Keçan Düdeyran
Batuvan Atmani	Bat(u)van Miran
Tayan Miran	Tayyan Müseraşa(Müsireşan)
Müseraşa.Sorhan	Hırkan Davudian

According to the *aşiret*'s terms we can name the left wing (baske çep) as Çıhsors and the right wing as Şilits. Hence this period's closeness factors show similarities with the works on nomads by the social scientists like Tapper, Swath ve Barth. Barth, 2001; Tapper, 2004; likewise, Gökalp says that, for example of Mahlemi party, turned to İsa Beği and Kadir Beği dualism and became the bends of *Mil* and *Zil* in Silvan. Gökalp, 1992:90.

importance could not go beyond their towns. However, this situation does not form an obstacle to see themselves maybe as historically the most essential parts of Turkey. Above remarks on the blurring names of the villages demonstrate the status of the town on the part of the state. Conversely, life in this small county is lived only for once and more than real. Subsequently, both *Deştis* and *Ciyais* try to find the historical proofs that would display that their *aşiret* was the most crowded and extremely important one; if there is not any, they strive for making and showing them. The matter of importance here is a significant one: in almost every period, the content is changing and anyhow the subject of this essay is to discuss the ideology of this change.

In fact, where life goes on for us, each bargain that *Deştis* and *Ciyais* enter into with the central authority is a part of being a human for us, as much as it is for them; therefore, it is real. In this small piece, there is a fundamental component of Turkey's citizenship adventure beginning from the Republic<sup>13</sup>.

From the 1950s, the population of *Bizim*, being originally Assyrian, was broken due to the *Varlık Vergisi* (Wealth Tax ) practices and also emigration of Moslim Kurds to the county borough. After the Assyrians rapidly had left the town, escaped to Istanbul and European cities, *Diimani* (settled) Moslim Kurd population became dominant in the country borough. The situation continued with an increase until 1980, but later the possession of the land started to turn to *koçers*.

*Koçers* (nomads) is a group which is constantly humiliated within the county. “*Sillikli peynir* (greeny/blue cheese)” and “*siyah kofi* (black scarf)” are the two metonymies of this humiliation. The cheese is a special one; *koçers* make it with fresh milk and mixed fresh garlic which they had collected near Van. It is a sharp-smelling cheese and regarded as the chief responsible for *Brucella* in the urban area. Hence, *koçer* signifies a sort of rebellious rabbles that are against the state and sell unhealthy and fetid-sassy cheese for the sake of profit.

Alternatively, nomads consider their old nomadic lives as the best period of freedom<sup>14</sup>. In all *koçer* narratives, “*küştar*” which we can refer as partnership of risk was

---

<sup>13</sup> See Özgen, H.N., 2004 for a similar understanding of history and the traces in our political geography.

<sup>14</sup> İbn-i Haldun says, “If the two sides are equal in terms of strength, the one that is more accustomed to a nomadic life wins the triumph. Nomad is a person born as a soldier. He is always ready to go on a journey with his daily facilities such as his horse, equipment and reserve food. At the same time, he says a feeling of space is in his employ.” See Bloch, 1995: 64. Here the space implies *dağılık* just as *Deştis* say. That is to

mentioned frequently. *Ciyais* said that they had not practised this for the last five or six years, and *Deştis* said that they had quitted it in the 1980s. *Küştar* means sharing all the expenses in the route of emigration (bribes, rent of the meadow, loss of sheep and property, offering, illnesses, smuggling etc.) at the end of the *out-season*. In the *aşirets* that were nomadic in more military times, *küştar* was divided into the number of residence (*mal, xane*); yet in the semi-nomadic *aşirets* and nomadic ones that were in the savannah, the partnership of risk was divided into the number of sheep. Additionally, *Deştis* mentioned a custom called *süd*: *süd* is the name of the milk that was milked once in a year for the agha in the *beri* (meadow). Besides, another obligation, *Serâne* demonstrates the portion of 1/10 from the wool of the sheep that clipped yearly and a lamb is born from each herd. In other words, *koçers*, no matter did they have a semi-nomadic period or not, talk about a feudal tradition of possession.

I would like to present to cases in order to explain the conflict of *Koçers* and *Dümanis*: Former one is about *Ciyais*' ornamentation of border smuggling with patriarchal elements and its consequences; and the latter is about the *Deştis*' settlement to the town.

The *Ciyai* narrative starts with listing the patriarchal elements: as one of the most important elements, bravery is exemplified with bringing the cost of the sheep died at the border. The second patriarchal element is strength, which is walking a very long way very quickly, being tough in the mountain. As an example for that, the story of a shepherd going to *şeyh* is mystified. In this period, both of the *aşirets*' most favourable attribute is that they pass animals from the border collectively; it was *koçers* that were mostly dealing with animal smuggling then. Hence, "being a smuggler, crossing the border, straggling with mines, being a male" are all the elements that defines being a *Koçer* and belonging an *aşiret*.

---

say, a state of freedom equivalent to liberty; what is more, approval and glorification of this state. Mehmed Hursîd Pasha, in his *Seyâhatname-i Hudûd*, tells the *rudeness* of nomadic *aşirets* as such: 'Some *mellahs* that bear the raft between Basra and Bagdat, have their silence clothes made up of something like wool in the summer and winter, when it is their turn to bear the raft, they take their clothes off and do the job naked, and upon this impertinence, Pasha, getting angry and blushing, learnt these after an investigation: Although Ragıp Agha, their pasha, had someone make them undershorts, they did what they had knew...' pp: 270. Pasha, being a modernist statesman, did not show clemency seeing the *mellahs* pull the rope of the raft without their undershorts on. The *aşirets* that the Pasha told about was I think, those which I talk of.

In 1953, *Ciyais*, in the land that they are presently settled, get into a blood feud with a sub group of their own *aşera*. The quarrel that started due to bids of meadows resulted in the death of a person, and then 82 people in total. In 1965, in the process of the trial, although there was an effort for reconciliation, “it was always the other side that break the promise” according to *Ciyais*. In 1978, this struggle resulted in the conviction of the powerful chief of *Ciyais* for 36 years. The chief whom I spoke with was a respected, solemn and a wise leader. He had been just released from the prison, which lasted for 29 years. He said that 4000 sheep were given as the cost, a total of 18 people died in the last incident in 1978. Yet, this crisis changed *Ciyais*’ concept of government; especially after the second event in 1965.

In 1965, *Ciyais*, trusting in their competence in using a gun, their *rezan*, and “lungs”, believed that they can pass the border without giving *bertil* and taking *destur*<sup>15</sup>. In spite of the ongoing blood feud, when they tried to take 1500 or 20000 sheep at the same night, in the leadership of a brave son who intends to prove the strength of the *aşiret*, five people died. The herd diminished nearly completely and the property of the *aşiret* was threatened seriously. However, the actual loss was the death of Mirza, who would lead after his father, the chief of that period. Mirza’s death is told as an utterly significant loss: “He was 22 or 23, we abandoned smuggling after Mirza. We repented. We were hurt a lot. I became a sinner; *başıma toprak saçtım* (became a rebel). I lost myself... He was just, calm and brave. If he were alive, maybe he would be the chief of the *aşiret*,” they say.

Immediately after this event, Medet Agha, from the other branch of the *aşiret*, becomes the leader of *Ciyais*, after the *aşiret* lost its actual chief due to a blood feud. In 1992, after the meadows had become forbidden, *Ciyais* living in the village could not own the land surrounding the village. *Aşiret* did not make head or tail of land and farming; now, the most important mechanism of defence is to create legends in order to possess the meadows and land and to take the memory of the good old days as shelter<sup>16</sup>.

---

<sup>15</sup> Rezan is the name given to the brave border guides who lead those engaged in smuggling between 1950-1980, picked up the goods, dismounted mines, formed pathways, allied with the soldier and agha; Bertil is the bribe given to the border police office for night passes, and Destur is the approval this permission. See Özgen, H.N., 2005.

<sup>16</sup> For the justification of meadow and land properties, see Yalçın-Heckman, 2002: 139.

The second event is the story of *Deştis*' settlement. In fact, they are counted among the Kurds came from Karabağ. Their shelter place is in Halep and their mountain pasture is around Bingöl. *Deştiler* is a nomadic *aşiret* that live on animal smuggling on the border and are proud of that; however, their only property is a small nomadic *aşiret* in the border that presently remains<sup>17</sup>.

Until 1975, continuing to the animal husbandry, the *aşiret* was resided in the town in 1974. This settlement between 1950 and 1980 might be regarded as getting a response from downwards upon the urge for enlivening the sort of protectionist unity in the central authority's relationship with its citizen<sup>18</sup>. Public houses were built in 544 households, in 1978, these houses were given to the *Deştis* for 900 thousands TL<sup>19</sup>; lastly, the ones that are finished in 2004 were given to the *Deştis* for 1.300.000.000 KL, by Toprak İskan İl Müdürlüğü's World Bank credit, and these were to be paid in 20 years without interest. *Deştis* have completely deserted their village claimed to be their actual place of settlement. Some of the *aşiret* (200 *xane*) are in the land of neighbouring counties; and some of them in Syria's land. In this respect, it would not be wrong to say that the group that was moved to *Bizim* has been the close relatives (*mirove*) of the leader and his own *taife* (crew) After 1974, there has been a significant change in *Bizim*. Following 1974, there has been a significant change in *Bizim*: the Assyrian mayor of the county, who was elected for three seasons, lost the 1977 elections due to the decrease of Christian and *Dümani* Kurd population in the county and *koçer* Kurd population's dominance. Thus, the municipality became *koçers*'. The chief of the *aşiret*, who was then referred to as 'The Mayor', took, at first, four of the parcels that were distributed and formed a place

---

<sup>17</sup> There is a yearning for the times of nomadic life, especially in women. They say, "Women were everything at those times, men did not have any power at all. Women were responsible for everything. We had bathed in the river together; we had only a ply of cloth. We washed it; while it was getting dry, we were naked in the river." Now, it is possible to see the traces of the expression of the sexuality of women and men in such simple terms in *Bizim* too. One of the best aspects of *koçer* traditions is perhaps that the women could express themselves more comfortably than *Dümani* women. Beşikçi states a different point on the equality of women and men, Beşikçi, 1992; whereas Erhan, in his work on Beritanli *aşiret*, claims that women's status was not similar to what Beşikçi says; his observations displayed just the opposite, 1992: 271.

<sup>18</sup> See Finkel ve Sirman, N., 1990: 1-21 for the patron -client relationship in the state-citizen relations. The focus of this claim that can be explained through quotations from Hale, is mainly that in third world countries the political structure is operated through patron-client relations and they could not go up into the stage of modernism; Yalçın-Heckman opposes this dichotomic discrimination. He claims that neither *aşiret* is a homogenous unity, nor politics is such a flat concept. Yalçın-Heckman, 1990: 289-311.

<sup>19</sup> Approximately 1000 \$.

for a house, then he moved to the county. He had two wives and both of his wives are the daughters of the other *koçer aŞirets*. All of his sons graduated from university and settle down in the county. All of them had a profession and perform these professions in the county. The brides were taken from a neighbouring *koçer aŞirets*.

*DeŞtis* started to open shops, first in the backstreets of the county, that sold drapery and haberdashery, agricultural medicine, contraband goods. At the end of 1980s, although the mayor accepted village guard system late, he standed as a candidate and also a mayor from all central right parties. He drives 3000 votes and he moved the whole group of his relatives of his *aŞiret* to the county and made every one have a house in 1000 square meters<sup>20</sup>.

In this period, *Bizim* was among the counties known to have provided support for the PKK most and had a trouble of Hizbullah. Students were attacked at the Local Boarding School, Assyrians started to leave the urban centre very quickly. In 1992, Mihail B. event largely determined the direction of the county. Mihail B. is an Assyrian who was claimed to be a courier- of the PKK; he was a tradesman and he was killed by Hizbullah in 1992. After this event, the PKK emphasised the association of Assyrians and Kurds (actually Christian-Moslim brotherhood) with the slogan of “brotherhood of people” and county citizens, for the first time come to the church and offered their condolences. This crisis is claimed to be the beginning of a holy war started by the PKK on Hizbullah.

In 1994, when the former mayor of the county, an Assyrian Ş. T. was killed with no eye witnesses, Assyrians deserted the county in a few months. At the same time, internal migration of the deserted villages started. The period that follows Gulf War and migration of the refugees was a period that was full of blood and pain in both villages and urban areas.

### **THE FINAL CONSTRUCTION OF AŞİRET AS AN ETHNIC IDENTITY:**

---

<sup>20</sup> On the power of the chief of the *aŞiret*, almost all the researchers point out the same condition: The villager does not always obey his chief! See Beşikçi, 1992: 290;, However, by Van Bruinessen, it is indicated that the matter of when it is obeyed is extremely complex. In this case, Asaf Agha, although was not a real and elected chief, his words on voting were obeyed; his villagers had important contributions to his property in the county. Yet, the case is not the same with *DeŞtis* outside the county; the chief has taken his own relatives in the county with himself. A significant part of *DeŞtis* live outside *Bizim*.

These days is a period in which being not settled and wandering in mountains, going to meadows<sup>21</sup>, happen to mean to be engaged in the PKK at any rate. Semi-nomads have been chased throughout the county borders and forced to be settled. It is forbidden to go up the meadows and the entire economics of the county has been transformed after the allowance of bringing contraband fuel oil from Habur frontier.

In this period, we see the lorries that go for a certain tonnage have started to bring fuel oil as much as they can carry and sell them for their own accounts. When this sort of trade was not yet named and the doers of this action were not that much widespread, it was the reason of the advertisements of “cheap” fuel oil in almost all areas of Turkey. “Cheap” fuel oil was tax-free, contraband, thus “passed over” fuel oil and it has been carried and sold in depots under the tankers that bring oil from Iraq or in supplementary tin depots. A fuel oil dealer says “At those times the economical situation of *Bizim* was better than today. 2000 litres was free and we were carrying watermelons, cement for help; we were going with a 2 tone depot and coming back with that of 10 tones.” Again in 1992, an intense contraband meat intake is mentioned. Certainly, it is not possible for every member of the *aşiret* to have a lorry. In this period, in the villages that have the agha system and in the hands of powerful *aşiret* aghas, there appeared tanker fleets. Between 1985 and 1994, the chief of *Deşîs*, the present mayor, started to have fuel oil tanker fleets. Hence, as an unearned profit of the border, contraband fuel oil has created a new class of rentier groups in connection with all the focuses of power in the process of seizing this surplus, e.g. oil incomes of global capitalism, war rentier.

i. ***Ciyais’ Experiment of Modernity and Real Other***

Up in the mountains, the situation is not that good. *Ciyais* are accused of absolutely being supporters of the PKK. That they had rejected village guard system, insisted on animal husbandry in the mountains have caused them to be in negative

---

<sup>21</sup> In other words, being independent, acting freely, indifferently, without being followed, that is, being a *dagi*. Kızılkaya, has made some nationalist contributions to the metaphor that conveys that of which explicates “going up to the mountain” over banditry and rebel romantic feudals. Kızılkaya, 1999. on the other hand, see Barkey, 1999 for banditry and going to the mountain, and that *dagilik* and banditry have gone far from the sublime values of banditry; in that it explicates that being from the mountain is related to how much it is necessary to bargain with the state.



position in the eyes of the state; they did not have any land property apart from the house lands in the village that they live. Just in this period, they needed a strong leadership, but their agha, Medet was busy with marrying for the third time.

Güler, had become the bride of 45 year old Medet Agha at the age of 27, as his third wife (*hevi-kuma*). It has been told that she is a graduate of a vocational school. Although her past and the reasons of not marrying until that age are not ever mentioned, it is her political consciousness overflowing from her speeches that actually renders Güler authoritative and respected. Avoiding declarations that might cause some speculations, it would be more convenient to talk about Güler's other characteristics: Güler, being a wise (and educated) city woman, has firstly dismissed the first two wives of her husband from home, gathered their children under her own roof and she, herself took care of the education of especially the elder son. She treated the women in the village as she was the wife of the agha and criticized their outfits, the way they speak and their manners; she humiliated and corrected them. She had sold her wedding jewellery, bought two minibuses and started to run them between the village and the county. She also had a herd of her own. She completely had urban behavioural stereotype within herself and most of these were ornamented with consumption labels. Subsequently, Medet Agha sold the sheep and started to buy the land surrounding the village<sup>22</sup>.

However, 1998 was a turning point for Medet Agha: he accepted being a village guard, bought the mickey mouse village guard outfit, in the same year the population of the village increased on the official documents and they qualified for being a county. A land of about 120.000.000 acres surrounding the village was given to the ownership of the village, what is more, a building for the office of the mayor which would save Güler from serving and encountering the villagers was built<sup>23</sup>. Raşık, a distant relative of Güler and Medet, and one or two more people started to get monthly salaries as municipal officers. A primary school was built in the village and they "allocated" the school dwelling for Medet Agha's second wife. Just then, Güler gave birth to a child;

---

<sup>22</sup> This might be counted as the beginning of the period that Medet becomes a liberal. Yet, the PKK, in its congress in January 1995, announced the 'politics of restructuring according to the changing order of the world. In the basis of these policies, there is 'PKK, as well as being a movement of humanity, it is fundamentally the acceptance of the need for the open (market) development. Hence, the PKK has noticed that old communist slogans are political dinosaurs and removed the symbol of hammer and sickle. Izady, M., 2004: 382.

<sup>23</sup> It is solved the matter of "The Smokefilled Room" by this way, see Barth, 2001a: 136.

unfortunately, her first child was a girl that could not shake the status of the first wives of the agha. A burial ground was invented in the village and ancient graves that were without writing and gravestone were collected and rearranged. Hence, everything happened simultaneously: The family became nuclear, the village developed and some urban values came up along with that of consumption.

Among the *Dümani* (settled) inhabitants of the county, it was perceived that Güler's acceptance of being the third wife was a sign of feudalism; besides that, an event that clarifies and consolidates the idea of *Ciyais* "already being *koçer* and against the state. Later on, this situation was acknowledged as a proof of the way that Medet Agha becomes the agha of the *aşiret* after being the chief.

Medet Agha built a house contiguous to the municipality, for himself and he raised the surrounding with gradually elevating walls. Medet Agha acted according to the expectations and nominated not himself but his bodyguard and relative Raşık in the new municipal elections. The situation might be counted as a proof of the change in social status—chief of the *aşiret* to agha, because aghas, as a village headman or a mayor, principally made a relative of them give and take orders. This way, they were also *keeping their honour* in front of the state<sup>24</sup>. However, the real leader of the *aşiret* was released from prison and his son, Kadir Agha won the elections. Thus, the *aşiret* returned to its leadership that was ongoing 30 years ago<sup>25</sup>.

---

<sup>24</sup> In 1995, when PKK reverted from the national policies and started to follow an ethnic national policy, one of the first indicators was the change of the definition of KURD. The meaning and content of Kırmançî, which was one of the criteria of defining being a Kurd, has changed. Kırmanç meant villager without a contract, in other words, *miskên*. Therefore, after 1980s and in 1990s, there was a socialist connotation of supporting Kırmanç by the PKK. However, with the change of the policy, the definition of Kırmanç has changed as well; it did not function as a means of equalizing with lowest class. Above all, being a Kırmanç was being apart from the other Kurdish tribes, Zaza, Guran and Sorani; speaking with a Kırmanç dialect; being a Bohtanlı and Şafii; thus, it based on a nationalist Kurdish ideal. See Özgen, H.N. 2003; Van Bruinessen, 1992b: 59. Hence, in Zizek's terms, "What we are dealing with today is thus a reverse process to that of the early modern constitution of a nation; in contrast to the 'nationalization of the ethnic- the de-ethnicization, the sublation' (Aufhebung) of the ethnic into the national- we are now dealing with the 'ethnicization of the national' with a renewed search for (or reconstitution of) ethnic roots," Zizek, 1997:12.

<sup>25</sup> At this point, it is necessary to stop and think about *aşiret*. It will be wrong to name *aşiret* as a modern process and a concept that is recreated in all periods. *Aşiret* is neither an invention, nor a modern process. It is not possible to agree with Eriksen in his claim that "tribe became...absolute only after the establishment of the colonial and the national state." Eriksen, 1993: 89. For example, Sami Zübeyda reports '*aşiret* is usually a mixture that is formed through the bonds of kinship and region both of which are not pure and especially in the mountainous hinterlands, the feeling of *aşiret* is always strong' Zübeyda, 1992 :16. See also Yalçın-Heckman, 2000. *Aşiret* and its leadership are certainly existent among the traditions. Certainly, the problem here lies in the way of overcoming the struggle of *aşiret*'s not only alliances and fights against the outside, but also inner conflicts. These positions are frequently renewed and the tradition is questioned.

Using Güler's second pregnancy as an excuse, Medet Agha settled down in Mersin and the period that was symbolised through Güler, finished in the eyes of the *aşiret*. *Ciyais* say that in "Güler's period", animal husbandry expired, village guard system was accepted, people obeyed the state; although the village became a municipality, this did not provide any benefits for anyone but Güler and a few relatives of Medet Agha. *Ciyais* could not integrate into the fuel oil trade that cultivated the county except for their Agha, because they could not collect the necessary amount of money. And Medet Agha's limited number of tankers did not earn the sufficient amount that was required for an additional income (driving, etc). Accordingly, when Raşık was defeated in the municipal elections, not only was Medet Agha removed from people's front, but also the *aşiret* had gained the opportunity to put a sense of nostalgia for the "koçer" days on the agenda. However, the whole village is aware of the fact that they should find new ways to live on, and they are still rather distant in their relationship with the state. Meanwhile, they have lost the privilege of being koçer, in other words, real Kurdish, thus standing up for their honour as rebels. This is another issue<sup>26</sup>.

---

For example, Barth asserts that apart from a small minority, everyone questions every single simple rule and there are many controversial comments on what is traditional and what is not, 2001a: 67. Yet, life is not that simple for *Ciyais* indeed. Medet Agha deadened their faith in their leaders that he can carry them back to good old days. At the moment, they are discussing whether they can utilize an old cultural bond as the cement of their identity. In short, we cannot deny that especially the support to the "organization" by the koçers does not function merely politically but it carries sincerity more important than simple expectations of benefit.

<sup>26</sup> Izady designates that PKK, in the long run, like any political parties remained at the same side with the dominant social movements. He says, "Recently, PKK distinguishes between 'progressive' and 'unprogressive' *aşiret* leaders and this differentiation is made according to the criterion of supporting the PKK, or not." Izady, 2004: 380 ve Van Bruinessen, 2003: 165-184. Yalçın-Heckman, in a more disguised manner, looks for the reason for the ongoing existence of the mechanisms of *aşiret* in the sharpness of the political and military struggles in the region. According to him, the *aşiret* bonds will continue its existence as long as it suits the general frame of ethnic movement, Yalçın-Heckman, 2000: 187. The point I would like to discuss starts here: the definition of *aşiret* that the ethnic movement agrees upon is rather advanced through terms of romantic, pastoral and being from the mountain. In other words, *aşirets* that are allied with PKK, are released from being named with the humiliated modernist patterns of agha system and elevated through the rhetoric of "dağilik and koçerlik". In literature and other narratives, definitions of being from the mountain, manhood, banditry, etc. are used with a reference to the past. For instance, in old references, Kalman quotes Abdülhalik Renda's report and mentions the overpopulation and emphasizes that Kurdish population was more than Turks: "When they are included the number increases for the disadvantage of the burghers and advantage of the Kurds." It is not necessary to indicate that the burghers here are Turks; and as it is understood, Kurds are villagers and highlanders (1996: 16). Also, Ziya Gökalp asserts that semi-nomads are divided into two as koçer and *ekinci* (agricultural): "Yet, men of honour are koçers. *Ekincis* have a dîn (lesser) status, since the other has the guns (1992: 43). Izady says that Kurds did not ever relied on the people from the savanna, on the contrary they regarded them as a potential 'CASH'. He claims that it is satisfactory to lose the characteristics of hero man in order to be a CASH, fresh water stipendiarian. See İzady, 2004: 329. Nowadays, in both Kızılkaya's works on brigands in the past (1999) and in Buldan's works on the PKK and guerrilla, metaphors of mountain, being a guerrilla and motherland

ii. *Deştis and Construction of the Folkloric Other*

On the other hand, a misfortune happened to the mayor of *Bizim*: his elder brother's son Mizgin, "went to the mountain" instead of continuing his education at a significant university in the big city. His name became almost a flag as he left such an important school, actually sacrificed a brilliant future for his ideals. I will not explain and discuss the process that would still cause problems for many people, but in short, I can say that Mizgin came safe and sound and the problem was dissolved.

Ferman Agha, mayor of *Bizim*'s elder brother and Mizgin's father, coming from the military wing, would be more acceptable as the real chief of the *aşiret*, was an important *Rezan* that organised border smuggling activities in the past and a wise, decent, fair, brave and skilful border smuggler. He believed in patriotic elements; perhaps that is the reason why the bargain of the process of *aşiret*'s placement in *Bizim* was not negotiated. Ferman Agha was forced to be left behind in the process of his settlement to the county. When Mizgin was at the mountain, Ferman, fulfilling the necessity, did not report his son; he was left isolated by his own family, and then tortured by security guards. Families reported their children immediately as a way of protecting their families and obviously those who had gone to the mountain. A reason for that is to determine that they do not approve the ones that go in order to protect the other children of the family and to announce the identity of them to the "up" and thus to delegate the responsibility to them. Ferman did not do that; he defended his son with 'eski onur' (old blood-honourship). Though, the situation, contrary to the expectations, was not harmful to anyone but him. The Mayor, who was the agha of *Deştis*, successfully played his part as the "one who pays the dues of having a nephew in the mountain and working dually for his community". Especially, in spite of a few "convenient" raids after the effect of the violence atmosphere had passed over and some rumours that they had helped the organisation, this time he won the elections as a nominee of the other central right party. He bought houses in two big cities, placed some of his sons there and began to get ready for being a member of the parliament. On the other hand, Ferman withdrew from being

---

are equalized. (1998: 26, 38, 42, 50, 60 vd.) And the two journalists kidnapped by the PKK, are writing interesting observations on being from the mountain, walking and the discourses of manhood. (Gürsel, K., 1999)

the chief of the *aşiret*, became a permanent staff of the municipality, and waited for his retirement.

Asaf Agha, The Mayor, had one of the important tanker fleets in 2003; he was among the few businessmen who could venture cross talk and bargain over the ways to share and tax the fuel oil that was circulated in Habur frontier. Meanwhile, having a nephew in the mountain whose name was famous, he obtained all the items that are necessary for the formation of an ethnic identity along with being a *koçer* and a Kurd, but not a *Cash*. Hence, he gained all the items necessary for the formation of a local other (Zizek 1997).

Consequently, we arrived at the most saturated point of the discussions on the arena chosen by the PKK and the state as a common area of struggle that is identity based on ethnicity. Henceforth, identity equals to the policy of ethnicity cannot fulfil the lives reviewed above. Even if Kurdishness and ethnicity have become a complementary rhetoric<sup>27</sup>, what will happen to the two sides one of which is the wild other that resists being indigo the other is the one that qualified in being local other (folkloric other) through fulfilling the conditions of museumasing, is ignored not only on the side of the state, but also on the opposite.

According to the researcher, this process elucidates how limited political subjectivity constructed upon being a Kurd is, how it is dependent on the power balances that seem completely opposite of one another and how significant to cast an eye on the *aşiret* so as to see an activity that is janus-faced, double edged and government oriented. Moreover, she discusses whom the diverse dimensions and outcomes of the struggle renders visible and invisible, and thus Kurdishnesses exist politically in an area that is fairly different from *aşiret*'s construction of ethnic identity.

---

<sup>27</sup> Also for an excellent discussion on tribe and modernity process and tribe- state relations see Jabar 2003: 69-110 and Dawood, 2003: 111-136.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ALAKOM, R., 1998, *Hoybun Örgütü ve Ağrı Ayaklanması*, Avesta Yay., İstanbul.
- ANDREWS, P. A., 1989, *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, Weisbaden.
- ARFA, H VE BOİS, T., (der.), 1991, *Kürtler Üzerine*, Öz-Ge Yay., Ankara.
- BARKEY, K., 1999, *Eşkiyalar ve Devlet*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yay. İstanbul.
- BARTH, F., 2001a, *Kürdistan'da Toplumsal Örgütlenmenin İlkeleri*, Avesta Yay., İstanbul.
- BARTH, F., 2001b (der.) *Etnik Gruplar ve Sınırları*, Bağlam Yay. İstanbul.
- BARTH, F., 2001c, "Pathan Kimliği", *Etnik Gruplar ve Sınırları*, der. F.Barth, Bağlam Yay., İstanbul.
- BEŞİKÇİ, İ., 1992, *Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni, Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller*, Yurt Yay., Ankara.
- BİLGİN, N., 2003, *Sosyal Psikoloji Sözlüğü, Kavramlar, Yaklaşımlar*, Bağlam Yay., İstanbul, Metafor Maddesi.
- BLOCH- M., 1995, *Feodal Toplum*, Gece Yay., Ankara.
- BULDAN, N., 1998, *Yasaklı Topraklar*, Aram Yay., İstanbul.
- BRUINESSEN, M.van, 1992a, *Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet*, Öz-ge Yay., İstanbul.
- BRUINESSEN, M.van, 1992b, "Kürt Toplumunu, Ulusçuluk ve Mülteci Sorunları", *Kürtler: Güncel Bir Araştırma*, Kreyenbroek-Sperl (der.), Cep Yay., İstanbul, s 38-72.
- BRUINESSEN, M.van, 1995, *Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar*, İletişim, İstanbul.
- BRUINESSEN, M.van, 2003, "Kurds, States and Tribes", *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*, Faleh Abdul-Jabar- Hosham Dawod (der.), Saqi Publ. p 165-184.
- DAWOOD, Hosham, 2003, "The 'State-ization' of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The Case of Iraq"(in) *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*, Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawood, Saqi Publs, p: 11-136.
- ERHAN, S., 1992 *Identity Formation and Political Organization Among Anatolian Nomads: The Beritanlı Case*, Unpublshd. Ph.D Dissertation, The University of Texas, Austin.

- ERİKSEN, T. Hylland, 1993, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, Pluto Press, NewYork and London.
- FINKEL, A ve SİRMAN, N., 1990 “Introduction”, (içinde) *Turkish State and Turkish Society*, A.Finkel ve N.Sirman (der), Routledge, NewYork, p: 1-21.
- GÖKALP, Z., 1992, *Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler*, Sosyal Yay., İstanbul.
- GÜRSEL, K., 1999, *Dağdakiler: Bağok'tan Gabar'a 26 Gün*, Metis Güncel, Siyahbeyaz Dizisi, İstanbul.
- HALAÇOĞLU, Y., 1997, *XVIII.Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İskan Siyaseti Ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Bastmevi, Ankara.
- HOLLERVEGER, H., 1999, *Turabdin; Living Cultural Heritage-Canlı Kültür Mirası*, Linz, Österreich.
- IZADY, M. R., 2004, *Bir El Kitabı; Kürtler*, Doz Yay., İstanbul.
- JABAR, A., Faleh, 2003, “ Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968-1998” (in) *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*, Faleh Abdul-Jabar and Hosham Dawood, Saqi Publs, p: 69-110.
- MARX, K. ve ENGELS- F., 1997, *Kapitalizm Öncesi Ekonomi Biçimleri*, Sol Yay., Ankara.
- KALMAN, M., 1996, *İngiliz ve Türk Belgelerinde Botan Direnişleri, 1925-1938*, Med Yay., İstanbul.
- KATİP ÇELEBİ, 11421 (732), *Cihannüma*, (ed.) İbrahim Müteferrika-İstanbul.
- KIZILKAYA, M., 1999 *Eski Zaman Eşkiyaları*, Sel Yay., İstanbul.
- MİHOTULİ, S., 1992, *Arya Uygarlıklarından Kürtlere*, Koral Yay., İstanbul.
- MİNORSKY, V., *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Kürtler Maddesi, s: 1089-1114.
- ÖZGEN, H., N., 2003, *Van-Özalp ve 33 Kurşun Olayı, Toplumsal Hafızanın Hatırlama ve Unutma Biçimleri*, TÜSTAV Yay., İstanbul.
- ÖZGEN, H., N., 2005 “Sınırın İktisadi Antropolojisi: Suriye ve Irak Sınırlarında İki Kasaba”, *II. Antropoloji Kongresi*, Epsilon yay., İstanbul (basımda).
- TAPPER, R., 2004, *İran'ın Sınır Boylarında Göçebeler: Şahsevenlerin Toplumsal ve Politik Tarihi*, İmge Yay., Ankara.

YALÇIN-HECKMANN, L., 1990, "Kurdish Tribal Organization and Local Political Processes", (içinde) *Turkish State and Turkish Society*, A.Finkel ve N.Sirman (der), Routledge, NewYork., s: 289-311.

YALÇIN-HECKMANN, L., 2000, "Kürt Aşiretleri, Aşiret Liderleri ve Global Süreçler: Hakkari'de Oramarî Örneği", *Toplum ve Bilim*, Bahar, 2000: 84, s:172-188.

YALÇIN-HECKMANN, L., 2002, *Kürtlerde Aşiret ve Akrabalık İlişkileri*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul.

ZÜBEYDA, S., 1992, "Giriş", *Kürtler: Güncel Bir Araştırma*, Kreyenbroek-Sperl (der.), Cep Yay., İstanbul, s: 5-14.

ZİZEK, S., 1997, "Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism", *New Left Review*, Sept-Oct. 1/225, s:28-51.